12-25 February 2023
Fortnightly newsletter tracking high-level policy signals sent by China’s top leaders. For more information, visit About Five Things.
Commentary
In the run-up to last November’s CPC National Congress, Chinese propaganda’s principal focus was the seamless transition from a party leadership dominated by Xi Jinping to a further period of party leadership dominated by Xi Jinping.
With that matter settled at the congress, a content vacuum was created that China’s propaganda cadres up to now have struggled to fill, namely exactly what that leadership team was going to do.
Part of the reason for that is the gap that naturally occurs between a new Chinese leadership team being formed at the Party congress and the meeting of the National People’s Congress around half a year later where they formally take up offices of government.
And of course it is possible that at this year’s NPC meeting, due to open on 5 March, a programme of polices will be announced.
Yet it also seems possible that while a framework for running China is in place – Xi’s leadership team; the circumstances of China today and how to understand it (“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era”, 习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想); the way forward of China’s “New Journey” to build a modern socialist country in all respects by the centenary goal of 2049 – the measures for realizing this have yet to be determined.
For the Party, this can occur at the Second Plenum, which is ongoing now in Beijing (Chinese / Machine translation). This second meeting of all of the new Party leaders chosen in October specifies the institutional reforms that Xi and China’s leaders wish to use to implement their framework. But the signals from this will not be issued for a few more weeks. And so for the public, and outside watchers, they await word on what might be next.
This vacuum at the heart of China’s national project wasn’t there from the 1980s to the early 2010s; economic growth was the end, and measures to grow the economy were the means. Today, however, it is not obvious what should be motivating people day to day.
“Several Major Issues in Current Economic Work” (Chinese / Machine translation), an article about a Xi Jinping speech in by Seeking Truth magazine, published by China’s propaganda organs and one of the most conservative of the official media, nicely highlighted both what is at stake and the difficulties China’s leaders are having coming up with an action plan. It begins:
[E]conomic work in 2023 is full of complexities. It is necessary to proceed from the strategic overall situation, grasp the main contradictions, start from improving social psychological expectations and boost development confidence, grasp major key links, and do a good job.
It then goes on to note that a big problem is weak private demand. As almost all economists agree, China’s population does not account for as great a share of overall economic consumption as it should; they should have more to spend, and they should spend more of what they have instead of saving it.
Yet from that point on, the piece never ventures beyond saying that it would be good if good things happened: that both the private and public sectors should be given equal support (the “Two Unwaverings” (两个毫不动摇); that foreign capital should be attracted and utilized; that major economic risks should be prevented and resolved; that reforms should be deepened.
Likewise, the article “Effectively strengthen basic research and consolidate the foundation of self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology” (Chinese / Machine translation) noted China’s aspirations to being a world science and technology leader.
Two sentences reported how Gong Qihuang, president of Peking University, “explained this issue and put forward work suggestions” to the Politburo Central Committee.
It would have been interesting to know what those suggestions were, but the entire rest of the article featured Xi Jinping outlining his extensive ambitions. For their scope, they are worth reading, but what machinery will be put in place to realize them is most likely to occur at the Second Plenum discussed above.
Of course, some of this is how the CPC behaves: its leaders announce broad goals, then organizations lower down the hierarchy come up with specific measures. And yet it is far from clear that the CPC’s leaders have any clarity themselves about what such measures might look like if they were presented.
In this context, it is striking that the second most widely published article of the fortnight was the call, once again, to “grasp the connotation” of model soldier Lei Feng’s spirit (Chinese / Machine translation). Sixty years after Mao Zedong first exhorted people to study the invented life of this figure, the same tired banalities are trotted out:
On the new journey, to deepen and expand the activities of learning from Lei Feng, it is necessary to deeply study the important expositions of General Secretary Xi Jinping on carrying forward the spirit of Lei Feng, deeply grasp the connotation and practical requirements of the spirit of Lei Feng, guide party members, cadres, and the masses to pursue lofty ideals, and practice the core of socialist values, inspire great enthusiasm for loving the party, the country and socialism, more firmly support the “two establishments” and resolutely achieve the “two safeguards”, consciously integrate personal pursuits into the struggle for the cause of the party and the people, and contribute to Chinese-style modernization.
China’s leaders face a tricky period; their zero-Covid strategy crumbled because of the difficulty of making changes to a one-dimensional policy based around top-down mobilization. If China is to make the transition to being a sophisticated, modern society, its population will need more refined messaging than this, but even more will they need a sophisticated policy programme — and the institutional structure in place that gives out enough incentives to implement it.
Top-ranked articles for 12-25 February 2023
% = percentage of publications carrying the article
1. Listen to the recent report on the prevention and control of the Covid epidemic
听取近期新冠疫情防控工作情况汇报
Xinhua News Agency, 16 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 57%
2. Deeply grasping the connotation of Lei Feng’s Spirit; Let the spirit of Lei Feng shine brighter in the new era
深刻把握雷锋精神的时代内涵 让雷锋精神在新时代绽放更加璀璨的光芒
Xinhua News Agency, 23 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 51%
3. Decision taken to hold the Second Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee
决定召开二十届二中全会
Xinhua News Agency, 21 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 51%
4. Effectively strengthen basic research and consolidate the foundation of self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology
切实加强基础研究 夯实科技自立自强根基
Xinhua News Agency, 22 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 49%
5. Xi Jinping holds talks with Iranian President Rahim
习近平同伊朗总统莱希举行会谈
Xinhua News Agency, 14 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 46%
6. Several major issues in current economic work
当前经济工作的几个重大问题
Xinhua News Agency, 15 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 46%
7. “Excerpts of Xi Jinping’s Discourse on Urban Work” published
《习近平关于城市工作论述摘编》出版发行
Xinhua News Agency, 20 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 40%
8. Xi Jinping to “China + Five Central Asian Countries”; Congratulatory letter from industry and investment cooperation forum
习近平向“中国+中亚五国” 产业与投资合作论坛致贺信
Xinhua News Agency, 16 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 38%
9. Xi Jinping replies to Greek scholars
习近平复信希腊学者
Xinhua News Agency, 20 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 38%
10. Promoting Chinese-style modernization requires proper handling of several major relationships
推进中国式现代化需要处理好若干重大关系
Xinhua News Agency, 12 February 2023
Chinese / Machine translation / 37%
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